"GEORGIA ON MY MIND"* - REFLECTIONS
ON O'KEEFFE v. SNYDER
PaulaA. Franzese**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent centennial anniversary of the birth of celebrated
American artist Georgia O'Keeffe' offers occasion to reflect upon
the New Jersey Supreme Court's seminal pronouncement in the
heralded case of O'Keeffe v. Snyder.2 There, the court overruled
those New Jersey cases3 which had found the doctrine of adverse
possession applicable to actions involving personalty. Instead,
embracing the equitable principles that sustain the "discovery
rule," 4 the court ruled that a cause of action for replevin of a lost
or stolen chattel 5 does not accrue "until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence
should have discovered, facts which form the basis of a cause of
action.''6
While O'Keeffe has not precipitated a readily discernible shift
in other courts' treatment of conflicting ownership claims to personal property, 7 in New Jersey the ruling has served as important
* Music by Hoagy Carmichael, lyrics by Stuart Gorrell, Peer International Corp.

(1930).
** Assistant Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. A.B., Barnard College 1980, J.D., Columbia Law School 1983. The author wishes to thank
Robert A. DelVecchio and Arnold L. Natali, Jr. for their invaluable research
assistance.
I Born November 15, 1887, Georgia O'Keeffe is considered one of the most
outstanding American artists of the twentieth century. See generally N. CALLAWAY,
GEORGIA O'KEEFFE: ONE HUNDRED FLOWERS (1987); J. COWART & J. HAMILTON,
GEORGIA O'KEEFFE, ART AND LETrERS (1987); K. HOFFMAN, AN ENDURING SPIRIT:
THE ART OF GEORGIA O'KEEFFE (1984). Perhaps best known for her magnificent,
oversized flower paintings, O'Keeffe captured the land and its riches with lavish
textures and colors. See id. Georgia O'Keeffe died in 1986. In 1987, one of her
flower paintings (Black Hollyhock with Blue Larkspur, ca., 1930) was sold at Sotheby's
in New York for a record $1.9 million. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1987, at 29, col. 3.
2 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
3 Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Soc'y, 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 28 A.2d 189 (N.J.
1942); Joseph v. Lesnevich, 56 N.J. Super. 340, 153 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1959).
4 See infra notes 58-72, 107-09 and accompanying text.
5 The term "chattel" refers to "[a]n article of personal property, as opposed to
real property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 215 (5th ed. 1979). The term originated
from the Norman French. See United States v. Sischo, 262 F. Supp. 1001, 1005
(W.D. Wash. 1919).
6 OKeeffe, 83 N.J. at 491, 416 A.2d at 869.
7 See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
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authority for the continued equitable and expansive application
of the discovery rule.8 Moreover, the decision's departure from
the uneasy confines of adverse possession doctrine, 9 together
with its creative holding,' 0 provides an interesting yet discrete illustration of the New Jersey Supreme Court's well-established
willingness to introduce change by abandoning doctrines that in
the court's view no longer "represent[] current notions of rightness and fairness.""
II.
A.

THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS

Adverse Possession

The doctrine of adverse possession, "a composite of statutory and [decisional] law,"' 2 serves as a means of transferring title to property without the consent of the owner. Rooted in
policy imperatives that there be "a restricted duration for the assertion of 'aging claims,' and that the elapse of a reasonable time
3
should assure security to a person claiming to be [an] owner,"'
the acquisition of title is based on the expiration of the given jurisdiction's applicable statute of limitations.' 4 These statutes are
complemented by a large body of case law "as to the kind of possession by another, which is sufficient to cause the statutory period to begin to run, and to continue running, against the [true]
owner. ' "" Essentially, the courts have required that the possession be "(1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) exclusive,
(4) continuous, and (5) hostile under a claim of right."' 6
Thus, the acquisition of title to property by adverse posses8 See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 100, 104-06 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 101-02, 107-09, 122-30 and accompanying text.
IICollopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 39, 141 A.2d 276, 282
(1958). See infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text.
12

R.

POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 1012, at 1087 (R. Powell & P. Rohan

abr. ed. 1968).
13 Id. See also Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135
(1918) (doctrine's "great purpose is automatically to quiet all titles which are
openly and consistently asserted ....").
14 Ballantine, supra note 13., at 135; R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 4.1, at 33 (3d ed. 1975).
15 R. POWELL, supra note 12, § 1012, at 1087.
16 Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U.L. REV.
1122, 1123 (1984-85) (footnote omitted). See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 15.1 - 15.16 (Casner ed. 1952); C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 157-58 (1971); see also Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28
YALE L.J. 219 (1918); Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH.
U.L.Q 331 (1983); Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 17 N.Y.U. L.Q REV. 44 (1939).
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sion is linked inextricably to the expiration of a statute of limitations.' 7 Typically, the given limitations period does not begin to
run until all of the aforementioned elements of adverse possession are present.'
Consequently, "the expiration of the statutory period has the effect, not only of barring the legal remedy,
but also of extinguishing the owner's title and of transferring it to
the adverse possessor or possessors."19
Traditionally, the doctrine of adverse possession has been
applied to claims involving the acquisition of title to land. z°
However, it is well-settled that "[t]itle to chattels also may be acquired by adverse possession."'" As with real property, the possession must be "hostile, actual, visible, notorious, exclusive,
continuous, and under claim of ownership" for the applicable
limitations period.2 2 The time limits for "[a]ctions for the recovery of personal property are shorter than those relating to land
. . . [and] typically must be commenced between two and six
years after the cause of action accrued ....
Although well-established as a matter of doctrine, 24 rela17 R. BROWN, supra note 14, § 4.1, at 33; see Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV.
L. REV. 313, 318-19 (1889-90); Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 17 N.Y.U. L.Q. 44,
82 (1939-40).
18 R. BROWN, supra note 14, § 4.1, at 33; see, e.g., Content v. Dalton, 122 N.J. Eq.
425, 194 A. 286 (N.J. 1937).
19 R. BROWN, supra note 14, § 4.1, at 33 (footnote omitted). See generally Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (1897); Walsh, supra note 16, at
82; Symposium, Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 661
(1986); Comment, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177 (1950).
20 R. POWELL, supra note 12, §§ 1012-1027; C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 157-58 (1971). Indeed, the New Jersey courts have a long history
of invoking "[tihe principles on which the doctrine of title by adverse possession
rests" to actions concerning land. Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527, 545 (N.J. 1879);
see Braue v. Fleck, 23 N.J. 1, 16, 127 A.2d 1, 9 (1956) (and cases cited therein);
Gordon v. Lumberville Delaware Bridge Co., 108 N.J.L. 261, 158 A. 388 (N.J.
1932). In NewJersey, the applicable statute of limitations governing the acquisition
of title to real property by adverse possession is 30 years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 1430 (West 1987). See Rullis v. Jacobi, 79 N.J. Super. 525, 192 A.2d 186 (Ch. Div.
1963).
21 J. BRUCE, J. ELY & C. BOSTICK, MODERN PROPERTY LAW 669 (1984). See 3 AM.
JUR. 2d Adverse Possession § 202 (1986); 51 AM. JUR. 2d Limitations of Actions § 90
(1986); 3 AMERICAN LAWOF PROPERTY § 15.16, at 834 (1952); R. BROWN, supra note
14, at 99 4.1 - 4.2; Ames, supra note 17, at 321-22; Bordwell, Property in Chattels, 29
HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1915-16); and infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
22 Isham v. Cudlip, 33 Ill. App. 2d 254, 268, 179 N.E.2d 25, 32 (1962). See also
infra note 42 (listing cases embracing adverse possession theory).
23 J. BRUCE, J. ELY & C. BOSTICK, supra note 21, at 669. See, e.g., Lightfoot v.
Davis, 198 N.Y. 261, 91 N.E. 582 (1910) (applying six-year statutory period).
24 See supra note 21 and infra note 41.
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tively few cases have had occasion to apply adverse possession to
suits involving chattels.2 5 Significantly, in what has been characterized as "one of the leading cases" to explain and apply adverse possession to personal property,2 6 the New Jersey Court of
Errors and Appeals 2 v seized the opportunity to issue a definitive
pronouncement on the matter. The case, Redmond v. New Jersey
Historical Society, 28 concerned entitlement to a portrait of Captain
James Lawrence, painted by American artist Gilbert Stuart.29
Captain Lawrence's granddaughter bequeathed the painting to
her son, and stipulated that, if he should die without descendants, it should go to the New Jersey Historical Society. 0 She
died in 1887, leaving her son, who was then fourteen years old.
In 1888, one of her executors delivered the painting to the Historical Society, where it remained for more than fifty years, until
1938, when the son died and his devisees demanded its return.3 '
When the Historical Society refused, the legatees filed a replevin
action.3 2 The Historical Society countered that the statute of limitations had run and that it was now vested with title to the work
by adverse possession.
Called upon to consider whether the doctrine of adverse
possession applied to chattels (an "interesting question" of first
impression in New Jersey 4 ), the Court of Errors and Appeals
noted:
By the great weight of authorities elsewhere, it is settled
that "the law relating to adverse possession of chattels, while
differing in some respects from that which relates to adverse
possession of lands, bears a close analogy thereto. Under the
25 SeeJ. CRIBBET & C.JOHNSON, PROPERTY 151 (5th ed. 1984); see also infra notes
42, 114-16 and accompanying text.
26 Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statues and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1122, 1142 n.79 (1980).
27 The Court of Errors and Appeals served as New Jersey's high court until
1947, when the state ratified its current constitution. G. TARR & M. PORTER, STATE
SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 188-89 (1988).
28 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 28 A.2d 189 (N.J. 1942).
29 Id. at 466, 28 A.2d at 191. Captain James Lawrence, born in New Jersey, "was
a distinguished American naval officer in the War of 1812 and the author of the
famous command 'Don't give up the ship.'" Id. at 466-67, 28 A.2d at 191.
30 Id. at 467, 28 A.2d at 191.
31 Id. at 467-68, 28 A.2d at 191.
32 Id. at 468, 28 A.2d at 191.
33 See id. at 468, 28 A.2d at 191-92. New Jersey's applicable statute of limitations
provides that an action for replevin or conversion of personal property must be
commenced within six years of accrual of the cause of action. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:14-1 (West 1987).
34 Redmond, 132 N.J. Eq. at 473, 28 A.2d at 194.
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statutes governing the subject[,] title to chattels may be lost
or acquired by adverse possession." 3 5
The court embraced "this like application of principle," satisfied
that to do so would be "sound and just."36 Thus, applying the traditional prerequisites to establishing title to real property by adverse
possession, the court ruled that the statute of limitations would not
begin to run against the true owner of personal property until possession became " 'hostile as well as actual, visible, exclusive and
continuous.' "" Since, at least until 1938, the Historical Society's
possession of the painting was permissive (the equivalent of a " 'voluntary bailment or gratuitous loan' ,,38), it failed to satisfy this first
requirement of adversity. 39 Accordingly, the statute of limitations
had not expired, and the court ordered the painting returned to the
plaintiffs .4
The Redmond court was accurate in its determination that the
weight of available authority countenances application of adverse
possession theory to actions involving personal property. 4 ' In the
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
37 Id. at 474, 28 A.2d at 194 (citations omitted).
38 Id. at 474-75, 28 A.2d at 194-95 (citation omitted in original). The court rejected the Historical Society's contrary contention that its possession of the portrait
was sufficiently hostile and adverse to cause the statutory period to run. Id.
39 Id. The court explained:
Among the several public announcements made as to its acquisition of
the portrait, the Society announced that it had become the "possessor"
of the portrait, that the portrait was "bequeathed" to it.... Obviously,
either the Society knew, or, under the circumstances, it was charged with
the knowledge ...that the only claim it had to the portrait was a contingent claim .... [T]he portrait was voluntarily delivered to and accepted
by the Society .... Clearly, the possession of the Society did not begin
nor did it continue to be (prior to 1938) in "hostility."
Id. at 475, 28 A.2d at 195.
40 See id. at 475-76, 28 A.2d at 195.
41 Id. at 473, 28 A.2d at 194. See generally Comment, supra note 26, at 1141
("weight of authority today sanctions [adverse possession] in suits involving personal property"); 51 AM. JUR. 2d Limitations of Actions § 90 ("it seems to be the generally accepted doctrine that by adverse possession, title to chattels may be
acquired which will be paramount to that of the true owner").
On the divergent "demand and refusal" approach (wherein an innocent purchaser of stolen goods becomes a wrongdoer only after refusing the owner's demand for their return), see DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 104 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding, in context of suit for return of Monet painting, that owner's obligation to make demand without unreasonable delay includes obligation to use due
diligence to locate stolen property); Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678
F.2d 1150, 1160-64 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying traditional New York "demand and
refusal" law to claim involving title to two Albrecht Durer paintings); Menzel v.
List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), affid as modified, 28
A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246
35
36
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years preceding and following its ruling, those courts confronted
with the issue clothed suits concerning title to chattels in the garb of
adverse possession theory.4 2 The fit was by no means perfect, however, as demonstrated by the second New Jersey case to apply adverse possession to chattels, Joseph v. Lesnevich.43
In Lesnevich, several negotiable bearer bonds were stolen from
the plaintiff, who immediately notified the police of the theft.4 4
Months later, in October, 1951, Lesnevich received an envelope
containing the bonds. 4 5 Later that month, he and his business partner pledged them to a credit company to secure a loan.4 6 At the
debtors' request, the bonds were sold on August 1, 1952 to the
president of the credit company, who in turn sold them to his son.4 7
On July 31, 1958, within one day of six years from the date of the
president's purchase, the true owner brought suit for conversion.4 s
The appellate division found that the action was time-barred, insofar as the "plaintiff's cause of action accrued as against the credit
company [in 1951] when it became pledgee of the bonds . ...""

Adhering to the literal letter of the law of adverse possession,
the court deemed the pledge of the bonds to the credit company to
be open possession.5" The plaintiff's efforts to locate the property
N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969) (reinstating trial court award of damages in
suit to recover Chagall painting seized by Nazis in 1941 and rediscovered in 1962).
See infra notes 107, 111.
42 See, e.g., Rabinof v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 830, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Rowe v. Bonneau-Jeter Hardware Co., 245 Ala. 326, 16 So. 2d 689 (1943); Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank of Dewitt, 254 Ark. 427, 494 S.W.2d 452 (1973); San Francisco Credit Clearing House v. Wells, 196 Cal. 701,239 P. 319 (1925); O'Connell v.
Chicago Park District, 376 111. 550, 34 N.E.2d 836 (1941); Isham v. Cudlip, 33 11.
App. 2d 254, 179 N.E.2d 25 (1962); Morey v. Haggerty, 122 Me. 212, 119 A. 527
(1923); Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 261, 91 N.E. 582 (1910); Adams v. Coon, 36
Okla. 644, 129 P. 851 (1913); Riesinger'sJewelers, Inc. v. Roberson, 582 P.2d 409
(Okla. Ct. App. 1978); Priester v. Milleman, 161 Pa. Super. 507, 55 A.2d 540 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1947); cf. Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 656 (E.D. Pa. 1979), af'd,
612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1979) (title to intangible property (Bessie Smith recording)
can be acquired by adverse possession).
43 56 N.J. Super. 340, 153 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1959).
44 Id. at 343-44, 153 A.2d at 351. Three local newspapers also reported the incident. Id. at 344, 153 A.2d at 351.
45 Id. at 344, 153 A.2d at 351-52. Lesnevich maintained that he had received the
bonds from an anonymous benefactor. Id.
46 Id. at 345, 153 A.2d at 352.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 353, 153 A.2d at 356. See supra note 33 (explaining New Jersey six-year
limitations period applicable to actions for conversion).
49 Id. at 355, 153 A.2d at 357.
50 Id. at 356, 153 A.2d at 358. The law of negotiable instruments was of no
consequence to the decision, insofar as the court deemed it unlikely that the credit
company and its president would be considered holders in due course. Id. at 352,
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were irrelevant, as was the fact that the plaintiff had not actually discovered the bonds' whereabouts until two years after they had been
pledged. As the court proclaimed, "[i]t is settled that ignorance of
the facts giving rise to the cause of action does not prevent the statute of limitations from running."'5 The credit company and its
president had held the bonds "as openly and notoriously as the nature of the property would permit." 5 2 Accordingly, the defendants
could not "be deprived of the benefit of the statute of limitations."5
Lesnevich demonstrates the difficulties inherent in applying the
"open and notorious" requirement to personalty. Developed in and
well-suited to the real property setting, this element of adverse possession doctrine serves to place the landowner on notice of the possessor's claim, so as "to enable [the owner] to take preventive
action." 5 4 Typically, the requirement is satisfied if the possessor
uses the land as the average owner would use it.5 5 The problem that
arises with respect to chattels, however, is that ordinary use of an
item is not likely to place the true owner on notice, particularly
when the property is moved to some other location.5 6 Still, it would
be another twenty years before the New Jersey courts would have
occasion to reconsider the issue, in O'Keeffe v. Snyder.5 7 In the interim, the New Jersey judiciary was fashioning the "discovery rule,"
an equitable doctrine that would come to provide an alternative to
the uneasy confines of adverse possession analysis.
B.

The Discovery Rule

To mitigate the harsh results that strict and mechanical adherence to a given statute of limitations might otherwise produce, courts have ruled that in appropriate cases a cause of action
will not accrue until the injured party discovers or reasonably
should have discovered facts which form the basis of the cause of
action. 58 This concept, known as the "discovery rule," was first
153 A.2d at 354. In any event, the court declared, since the applicable statute of
limitations had expired, the grant of summary judgment was proper. See id. at 357,
153 A.2d at 358.
51 Id. at 355, 153 A.2d at 357 (citations omitted).
52 Id
53 Id. at 356, 153 A.2d at 358.
54 R. POWELL, supra note 12, § 1013, at 1089.
55 Id. at § 1018.
56 See Comment, supra note 26, at 1144.
57 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
58 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 at 165-66 (5th ed. 1984). As summarized by Justice
Handler:

8
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recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1961, in the
context of a medical malpractice suit.5 9 Subsequent New Jersey
decisions acknowledged the pertinence of the doctrine in a host
of diverse contexts, 6° deeming the rule relevant "whenever equity and justice have seemed to call for its application."'"
Thus, "in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties
must be identified, evaluated and weighed ' 6 2 to ascertain
whether the cause of action may be brought even after the limitations period, as measured from the date of the alleged wrongful
conduct, has expired. 63 The legitimate aims of repose, including
the defendant's interest in being free from the specter as well as
[W]hen a party is either unaware that he has sustained an injury or,
although aware that an injury has occurred, he does not know that it is,
or may be, attributable to the fault of another, the cause of action does
not accrue until the discovery of the injury or facts suggesting the fault
of another person.
Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 432, 400 A.2d 1189, 1195 (1979).
59 Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961). In Fernandi, a wing nut
was left in a patient's abdomen following surgery, and was not detected for three
years. Id. at 435-36, 173 A.2d at 278. While the court confined application of the
discovery rule to such foreign body medical malpractice actions, subsequent decisions soon extended the concept to other areas of medical malpractice. See, e.g.,
Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) (alleged negligent radiation therapy); Yerzy v. Levine, 108 N.J. Super. 222, 260 A.2d 533 (App. Div. 1970) (negligent severance by surgeon of bile duct), aff'd per curiam as modified, 57 N.J. 234, 271
A.2d 425 (1970).
60 See, e.g., Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 386 A.2d 1310 (1978)
(products liability); Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662
(1972) (personal injury and property damage actions against designer of real property improvements); Diamond v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 51 N.J. 594, 242 A.2d
622 (1968) (action against utility for negligent installation of conduit); New Market
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968) (action against
land surveyor for negligent miscalculation of acreage); Rosenau v. City of New
Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968) (action based on water meter defect);
Federal Ins. Co. v. Hausler, 108 N.J. Super. 421, 261 A.2d 671 (App. Div. 1970)
(action based on stockbroker's error in wrongful detention of securities); Brown v.
College of Medicine & Dentistry, 167 N.J. Super. 532, 401 A.2d 288 (Law Div.
1979) (action based on union's breach of duty to 'epresent fairly plaintiff bargaining unit); Gibbins v. Kosuga, 121 N.J. Super. 252, 296 A.2d 557 (Law Div. 1972)
(breach of contract action against vendor of real property based on misrepresentation of well location).
61 Lopez, 62 N.J. at 273, 300 A.2d at 566. See supra note 60.
62 Id. at 274, 300 A.2d at 567.
63 See Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 115, 299 A.2d
394, 396 (1973). The NewJersey Supreme Court explained:
Where . . . the plaintiff does not know or have reason to know that he
has a cause of action against an identifiable defendant until after the
normal period of limitations has expired, the considerations of individual justice and the considerations of repose are in conflict and other
factors may fairly be brought into play.
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the often painful reality of aged claims (where "memories have
faded, witnesses have died and evidence has been lost" 64 ) must

be balanced against the hardship to the plaintiff in having his or
her claim barred although "the fact of the wrong lay hidden until
after the prescribed time had passed." 65 When the court finds
that the balance is struck in favor of the plaintiff,6 6 literal applica-

tion of the statute of limitations
will yield, thereby permitting as67
sertion of the cause of action.

The years preceding O'Keeffe found the New Jersey courts expansively fashioning the contours of the discovery rule, extending that doctrine's equitable reach whenever rigid adherence
to the rule of law would result in manifest injustice.68 Peculiar
factual conditions in diverse categories of actions, from personal
injury and property damage suits 6 9 to professional malpractice
claims,

70

permitted a finding that the plaintiff could not reason-

ably have known on the date the harm was inflicted that he or she
had sustained an injury, or that the injury was attributable to the
fault of another. 7 ' These cases shared as their common ground
circumstances strongly favoring the grant to the plaintiff of equitable relief. This landscape perhaps portended subsequent application of the discovery rule to an action for replevin of a
painting, where the plaintiff presumably could not have known,
through the exercise of due diligence, of the facts which
formed
72
loss.
actual
the
after
years
until
claim
the
of
the basis
III.

A.

O'KEEFFE V. SNYDER

Salient Facts

In March of 1946, Georgia O'Keeffe allegedly was the victim
of art theft, when three of her small oil paintings, entitled Cliffs,
Seaweed, and Fragments, were stolen from a New York art gallery.73
The purported crime was never reported to the authorities nor to
Lopez, 62 N.J. at 274, 300 A.2d at 567.
Id.
The decision whether to permit application of the discovery rule "should be
made by a judge and by a judge conscious of the equitable nature of the issue
before him." Id. at 275, 300 A.2d at 567 (footnote omitted).
67 See id. at 275-76, 300 A.2d at 567-68.
68 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
69 See Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
70 See New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633
(1968).
71 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
72 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
73 Id. at 484, 416 A.2d at 865.
64
65
66
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an insurance company, as the paintings were uninsured."4 It was
not until 1972 that O'Keeffe reported the theft to the Art Dealers
Association of America, Inc., which maintains a registry of stolen
art work.7 5
The whereabouts of the paintings remained unknown to
O'Keeffe until September of 1975, when she discovered that they
were in a New York art gallery.7 6 In February, 1976, she demanded their return from their present owner, Barry Snyder,
who less than one year earlier had purchased the paintings from
Ulrich Frank.7 7 Frank formally acquired the paintings from his
father in 1965, but claimed continuous possession for a period in
excess of thirty years insofar as his father allegedly was in possession of the art work as early as 1941.78 Until the sale in 1975, the
paintings were kept in the Frank family's private residences.7 9
When Snyder refused to return the paintings, O'Keeffe
brought an action in replevin. s Snyder motioned for summary
judgment, on the ground that the suit was barred by the expiration of the applicable limitations period,8 ' which requires that an
action for replevin be commenced within six years of accrual of
the cause of action.8 2 Moreover, Snyder maintained that title had
vested in Frank by adverse possession. 3 On her cross motion for
summary judgment, O'Keeffe asserted that because the paintings
were stolen, the statute of limitations had not run and title to
them had not passed. 4
74 Id. at 485, 416 A.2d at 865. However, O'Keeffe did mention the loss to associates in the art community, and discussed the matter with an administrator of the Art
Institute of Chicago. Id. at 484, 416 A.2d at 868.
75 Id. at 485-86, 416 A.2d at 866.
76 Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866.
77 Id. at 483, 486, 416 A.2d at 865-66. The appellate division opinion indicates
that Snyder paid $35,000 for the three paintings. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J.
Super. 75, 80, 405 A.2d 840, 842 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 83 N.J. 478,
416 A.2d 862 (1980).
78 OKeeffe, 83 N.J. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866. Thus, Frank's factual contentions
were inconsistent with O'Keeffe's allegation that the theft occurred in 1946. See id.
79 Id. In 1968, the paintings Cliffs and Fragmentswere exhibited anonymously in a
one day art show in Trenton, New Jersey. Id.
80 d.
81 Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866.
82 Id. at 483, 416 A.2d at 865. See supra note 33.
83 O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 486, 489, 416 A.2d at'866, 868.
84 Id. at 486-87, 416 A.2d at 866. For the purposes of these cross-motions, defendant Snyder conceded that the paintings had been stolen. Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at
866.
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The Lower Courts' Rulings

The trial court concluded that the paintings had not been
held "visibly, openly and notoriously,"" thereby precluding title
from vesting by adverse possession. Nonetheless, the court
granted Snyder's motion for summary judgment, on the ground
that O'Keeffe's action was barred because it was not commenced
within six years of the alleged theft.8 6 The appellate division,
bound by Redmond 87 and at least constrained by Lesnevich,"8 reversed the decision of the trial court on the theory that the defenses of adverse possession and expiration of the statute of
limitations were identical.8 9 The court explained:
[A]ctions for the recovery of property, real or personal, of the
character required by the law of adverse possession, has [sic]
persisted throughout the statutory period of limitations. With
respect to real property, that period is 20 or 30 years. With
respect to personal property, that period is six years. In both
cases, however, the property must be possessed for the required period in the required manner. If one of the essential
ingredients to adverse possession is missing, the claim for the
property is simply not barred.9"
Accordingly, the majority ruled that O'Keeffe could still enforce her
right to possession of the paintings. 9 '
Significantly, the majority and dissenting appellate division
opinions, albeit for different reasons, perceived difficulties in linking
the statute of limitations to adverse possession doctrine. The majority noted, "[w]e fully recognize that by adoption of this view, applying all of the requirements for the adverse possession of land to
chattels, we are in many, if not in most, cases foreclosing any real
opportunity to acquire adverse title to stolen personalty." 9'
The
dissent strenuously objected to the majority's "superimposition of
the doctrine of adverse possession upon the statute [of limita85 Id. at 496, 416 A.2d at 871. The unpublished opinion of the trial court is
contained in Amram, The Georgia 0 'Keeffe Case: NVew Questions About Stolen Art, MUSEUM
NEwsJan.-Feb. 1979, at 49-51, 71-72. The decision is discussed in Feldman, Stolen

Art Ruling, 4 ART & L. 93 (1979).

O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 488-89, 416 A.2d at 867-68.
Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Soc'y, 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 28 A.2d 189 (N.J.
1942). As noted, until 1947, the Court of Errors and Appeals served as New
Jersey's high court. See supra note 27.
88 Joseph v. Lesnevich, 56 N.J. Super. 340, 153 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1959).
89 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 86, 90, 405 A.2d 840, 845, 847 (App.
Div. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
90 O'Keeffe, 170 N.J. Super. at 89, 405 A.2d at 847.
91 Id. at 92, 405 A.2d at 848.
92 Id. at 86, 405 A.2d at 845.
86
87
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tions]," fearing that such linkage could "develop into a handbook
for larceny....-9 Instead, Judge Fritz proposed that the appropriate statutory period of limitation be measured not by analogy to adverse possession, but by application of the discovery rule. 9 4 So
measured, the six-year period of limitations would commence when
plaintiff knew or should have known of the cause of action.9 5
The appellate division's ruling was criticized as an illustration
of "a hard case making bad law." 96 One commentator charged that
"[b]y imposing an unattainably high standard of notoriety the court
admittedly rendered statutes of limitations entirely inoperable in replevin actions, saying only that such is the difficulty in applying real
property doctrines in a personal property context." 9 7 Certainly, the
lesson of the court's strained pronouncement (preordained in large
measure by the Redmond precedent),98 was that traditional adverse
possession doctrine, as applied to chattels, offered the potential for
arbitrary, if not disparate, results. Against this backdrop, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. 99
C.

The New Jersey Supreme Court's Pronouncement

Writing for the majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
Justice Pollock determined that "the doctrine of adverse possession no longer provides a fair and reasonable means of resolving
this kind of dispute."' 0 0 Consequently, the court overruled Redmond and Lesnevich and held instead that the discovery rule would
now apply to this action for replevin. 1°'
Accordingly,
"O'Keeffe's cause of action accrued when she first knew, or reasonably should have known through the exercise of due diligence, of the cause of action, including the identity of the
possessor of the paintings."' 10 2 Thus, the court reversed the deId. at 96, 405 A.2d at 850 (Fritz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 97, 405 A.2d 851 (Fritz, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 96-97, 405 A.2d at 850-51 (Fritz, J., dissenting).
96 Comment, supra note 26, at 1149 n. 114.
97 Id. at 1148.
98 Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Soc'y, 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 28 A.2d 189 (N.J.
1942). See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text. It has been postulated that had
there not been "such a strong and ready adverse possession precedent in New
Jersey," the appellate division in OKeeffe "probably would have adopted the discovery rule ...." Comment, supra note 26, at 1155 (footnote omitted).
99 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 81 N.J. 406, 408 A.2d 800 (1979).
100 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 496-97, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (1980).
1oM Id. at 493, 416 A.2d at 870.
102 Id. Justice Handler dissented, believing there to be "a much sounder approach ...than one that requires the parties to become enmeshed in duplicate or
cumulative hearings that focus on the essentially collateral issues of the statute of
93

94
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termination of the appellate division and remanded the case for
trial to resolve several outstanding factual issues."t 3
Significantly, the court's departure from the confines of adverse possession doctrine in large part was rooted in its perception of the "inherent problem" of applying the open and
notorious requirement to personalty. t0 4 As Justice Pollock hypothesized, it is doubtful that the owner of lost or stolen jewelry,
for instance, "would learn that someone is openly wearing that
10 5
jewelry in another county or even in the same municipality."'
Lesnevich had demonstrated that traditional adverse possession
doctrine would place the owner in the untenable position of having to locate the item within the statutory period or lose title.'0 6
By contrast, the discovery rule permits an owner ignorant of facts
which form the basis of the cause of action to preserve entitlement to repossession so long as he or she is duly diligent10 7 in
limitations and its possible tolling by an extended application of the discovery doctrine." Id. at 508, 416 A.2d at 878 (Handler,J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Handler
would recognize the "owner's right to assert a claim against a newly-revealed receiver or possessor of stolen art as well as the correlative right of such a possessor
to assert all equitable and legal defenses." Id. In a separate dissenting opinion,
Justice Sullivan embraced the majority's legal analysis but challenged its interpretation of the salient facts. Id. at 506-07, 416 A.2d at 877-78 (Sullivan,J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 484, 505, 416 A.2d at 865, 877. The principal case was never retried, as
the parties settled by agreeing to share the paintings. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1980,
§ 3, at 20, col. 1; see also Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 275, 353 n.139 (1982). Cliffs was sold at auction at Sotheby's in New York,
offered for sale jointly by O'Keeffe and Snyder. O'Keeffe, Princeton Gallery Settle Dispute on Ownership of Paintings, The Star-Ledger, Dec. 4, 1980, at 21, col. 1.
104 OKeeffe, 83 N.J. at 495, 416 A.2d at 871.
105 Id. at 496, 416 A.2d at 871. The court noted that the same concerns are not
implicated in the real property setting. Id. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873. Unlike personalty, "[r]eal estate is fixed and cannot be moved or concealed. The owner of real
property knows or should know where his property is located and reasonably can
be expected to be aware of open .

.

. possession [of] it." Id.

106 See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
107 The OKeeffe court contemplated that "[t]he meaning of due diligence will vary
with the facts of each case, including the nature and value of the personal property." O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873. Thus, the court explained, "with
respect to jewelry of moderate value, it may be sufficient if the owner reports the
theft to the police. With respect to art work of greater value, it may be reasonable
to expect an owner to do more." Id.
It is unclear, however, whether "due diligence" is to be measured by an objective standard of reasonableness or by a subjective assessment that would factor in
the given owner's unique abilities or resources. A recent Second Circuit Court of
Appeals case embraces the latter alternative, in the context of holding that under
New York's "demand and refusal" law an owner's obligation to make a demand for
lost or stolen property without unreasonable delay includes a duty to use due diligence to locate the property. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir.
1987); see supra note 41 and infra note 11. In examining the plaintiffs conduct to
determine whether she had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to recover
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seeking the item's return. Conversely, a dilatory plaintiff, who
either negligently or intentionally fails to pursue the chattel,
should not be permitted to disturb the defendant's justifiable repose. Thus, application of the discovery rule "shifts the emphasis
from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the
owner."' s As the O'Keeffe court elaborated, "[t]he focus of the
inquiry will no longer be whether the possessor has met the tests
of adverse possession, but whether the owner has acted with due
°
diligence in pursuing his or her personal property. ' 109
IV.

A.

THE O'KEEFFE LEGACY

Subsequent Applications

While the subject of considerable attention and commentary
when first announced," 0 O'Keeffe has not precipitated a readily
discernible shift from adverse possession doctrine in other
a stolen painting, the court took into account her status as a "wealthy and sophisticated art collector." DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112. Rejecting the lower court's finding
that the plaintiffs failure to search for the property was excusable in view of the fact
that she was elderly and that, as an individual, she could not be expected to wage a
comprehensive investigation, the Second Circuit noted that "even if she could not
have mounted a more extensive investigation herself, she could have retained
someone to do it for her." Id.
108 O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 497, 416 A.2d at 872. Moreover, as a consequence of the
court's ruling, the burden of proof shifts from possessor to owner. Justice Pollock
explained:
Our ruling not only changes the requirements for acquiring title to personal property after an alleged unlawful taking, but also shifts the burden of proof at trial. Under the doctrine of adverse possession, the
burden is on the possessor to prove the elements of adverse possession.
Under the discovery rule, the burden is on the owner as the one seeking
the benefit of the rule to establish facts that would justify deferring the
beginning of the period of limitations.
Id. at 500, 416 A.2d at 873 (citations omitted).
109 Id. at 497, 416 A.2d at 872.
I 1o See, e.g., Ward, The Georgia Grind-Can the Common Law Accommodate the Problems
of Title in the Art World, Observations on a Recent Case, 8J. COLLEGE & U.L. 533 (198182); Wertheimer, The Implications of the O'Keeffe Case, 6 ART & L. 44 (1981); Note,
Title Disputes in the Art Mlarket." An Emerging Duty of Care for Art MVerchants, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 443 (1983); Survey, Personal Property - Adverse Possession - In Action for
Replevin of a Chattel, "Discovery Rule, "Not Doctrine of Adverse Possession, Determines When
Cause of Action Accruedfor Purpose of Statute of Limitations, 11 SETON HALL. L. REV. 347
(1980); see also Amram, supra note 85 (discussing trial court decision); Feldman,
supra note 85 (discussing trial court decision); Comment, supra note 26 (discussing
trial and appellate court rulings and calling for application of discovery rule). Moreover, the case has received considerable treatment in many, if not most, casebooks
on property law. See, e.g., 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM k A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 80-94 (4th ed. 1984);J. BRUCE, J. ELY & C. BOSTICK, MODERN PROPERTY
LAW 669 (1984); A. CASNER & W. LEACH, PROPERTY 63-64 (2d ed. 1969);J. CRIBBET
& C. JOHNSON, PROPERTY 154-67 (5th ed. 1984); C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MAR-
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courts' treatment of conflicting ownership claims to personalty.'" Other jurisdictions have not expressly embraced the ruling. 112 Nationally, the decision has not prompted application of
the discovery rule
to analogous actions for recovery of lost or
13
stolen chattels.'

145-57 (2d ed. 1983);J. DUKEMINIER &J. KRIER, PROPERTY 117-29
(2d ed. 1988); S. KURTZ & H. HOVENKAMP, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 212-26 (1987).
111 Significantly, however, a recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals case to apply
New York's "demand and refusal" doctrine to a suit for recovery of a stolen Monet
painting held that "an owner's obligation to make a demand without unreasonable
delay includes an obligation to use due diligence to locate stolen property."
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1987). The court determined
that the plaintiff's failure to conduct "even the most minimal investigation" during
a 24 year period would prevent her from disturbing the repose of the defendant
good faith purchaser who had owned the painting for 30 years. Id. at 112. Certain
jurisdictions adhere to some semblance of adverse possession doctrine. See supra
notes 41-42, 107. New York law, however, focuses on the conduct of the owner of
lost or stolen property such that when the owner proceeds against an innocent purchaser, the limitations period begins to run only when the owner demands return
of the property and the purchaser refuses. See supra note 41. The demand for return
must be made within a reasonable time after the possessor is identified. See id.
DeWeerth augments this emphasis on the owner's actions by imposing the additional
obligation that the owner use reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the property. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108-09. The court cited O'Keeffe when it noted that "[a]t
least one other state has recently confronted the limitations problem in the context
of stolen art and has imposed a duty of reasonable investigation." Id. at 109 (citing
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980)). Elaborating on the sort of
"search efforts that may reasonably be expected of an owner" of lost or stolen
property, DeWeerth helps to elucidate the nature and extent of the due diligence
requirement. Id. at 110. See supra note 107.
112 See supra note 111 and infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
113 However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Illinois law to an
action for return of a painting, found it "worth noting," in dictum, "that the
Supreme Court of NewJersey, in interpreting a discovery rule apparently much like
Illinois', has held that an artist . . .is entitled to invoke the discovery rule when
diligently seeking the recovery of a lost or stolen painting." Mucha v. King, 792
F.2d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 1986)(citing O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862
(1980)). The case was decided on other grounds, with judge Posner, writing for the
court, leaving it"a matter of speculation whether an Illinois court would apply [the
discovery rule] in a case such as this ...... Id. Significantly, Illinois shares with
New Jersey a particularly well-developed and expansively-applied discovery rule.
See, e.g., Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
61 111. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975) (defamation suit); Lipsey v. Michael Reese
Hosp., 46 Il. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970) (non-foreign body medical malpractice
action); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 III. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) (misrepresentation
based on inaccurate land survey); Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 330,
355 N.E.2d 686 (I11.
App. Ct. 1976) (wrongful death action). See generally Comment,
The Evolution of Illinios Tort Statutes of Limitation: Where Are I'Ve Going and Why?, 53
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 673 (1977).
On the relevance of the discovery rule to actions for conversion, compare
Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co., 450 So.2d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(cause of action will not accrue until plaintiff knows or is chargeable with knowledge of invasion of his legal right) with Fuscellaro v. Industrial National Corp., 117
TIN, PROPERTY
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At least part of the reason for this quiescence may lie in the
simple fact that such matters are neither litigated nor revisited
with any frequency." 4 Since 1980 (when O'Keeffe was decided),
few courts have had even the opportunity to consider, within the
rubric of adverse possession or discovery rule doctrine, issues
pertaining to entitlement to lost or stolen personalty." 5 Indeed,
since O'Keeffe, no NewJersey court has had occasion to apply the
supreme court's standard squarely to a suit concerning the timet6
liness of an action to regain possession of lost or stolen goods."
More fundamentally, it may be argued that by manipulating
the traditional "open and notorious" requirement to accommodate the special circumstances of personalty, results comparable
to those achieved by O'Keeffe are possible within the framework of
adverse possession doctrine." 7 As Professor Brown notes in
summarizing courts' application of adverse possession to personal property:
While an innocent removal of the chattel from the locality or
even from the state does not alone prevent the statute operating, simple morality requires that one who intentionally, by removal, concealment or otherwise prevents the owner from
ascertaining his property's whereabouts should not by such
means defeat the latter's cause of action and acquire title to
the withheld goods. While it is possible that a thief, or a purR.I. 558, 368 A.2d 1227 (1977) (representing prevalent view refusing to apply discovery rule in suits for conversion). Accord, Trust Company Bank v. Union Circulation Co., 241 Ga. 343, 245 S.E.2d 297 (1978); Christensen Grain, Inc. v. Garden
City Coop. Equity Exch., 192 Kan. 785, 391 P.2d 81 (1964); Continental Casualty
Co. v. Huron Valley Nat'l Bank, 85 Mich. App. 319, 271 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978).
114 Most courts' adherence to adverse possession doctrine in the context of
claims involving personalty has' remained unchallenged and unchanged. See supra
notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. As a general matter, it has
been noted that adverse possession law "tends to be treated as a quiet backwater.
Both judicial opinions and leading treatises treat the legal doctrine as settled. The
theory underlying the doctrine, although routinely discussed in the opening weeks
of first-year property courses, is only rarely aired in the law reviews anymore." Merrill, supra note 16, at 1122.
116 One lower court, in the context of resolving the "novel" question of how long
a gratuitous bailment of indefinite duration should survive "in the absence of any
demand by the bailor and of any act by the bailee inconsistent with the bailor's
title," noted in dicta the OKeeffe standard. Desiderio v. D'Ambrosio, 190 N.J. Super.
424. 428-29, 463 A.2d 986, 987-88 (Ch. Div. 1983). Called upon to determine
whether the plaintiffs belated demand for goods left in the defendant's custody was
timely (as opposed to whether a suit for breach of the bailment agreement was
barred), the court concluded "that plaintiff failed to make a demand for the property within a reasonable time of the bailment." Id. at 430, 463 A.2d at 989.
117 See P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 59 (1984).

GEORGIA ON MY MIND

1989]

chaser from a thief, with knowledge may hold so openly and
notoriously as to acquire title, secret rather than open holding
will be presumed.' "'
Professor Helmholz ventures further still when he posits that
"[t]he heralded recent case of O'Keeffe v. Snyder" in fact is "less innovative than the New Jersey Supreme Court announced. The test it
adopted is very much like what American courts have long done in
practice." '' 9 He maintains that O'Keeffe "expressly laid down" the
"hornbook rule of simple possession when the equities have favored
120
the bona fide purchaser."'
For title to accrue to the purchaser, three things generally
must exist: (1) honesty on the part of the purchaser; (2) open
use by him for the statutory period; and (3) failure on the part
12 1
of the owner to take reasonable steps to secure his rights.
This characterization, however, belies the genesis and content
of the O'Keeffe ruling, which subjugates the traditional requirement
of visible and open possession (with its inherent emphasis on the
possessor's actions), in favor of a discovery rule that renders controlling the conduct of the owner. 122 With respect to personalty, the
viability of the discovery rule as an alternative to the open and notorious requirement, however that requirement is finessed or quietly
defied, seems manifest. 12 3 At a minimum, the discovery rule obligates a more explicit and responsive balancing of the relevant equities, 124 thereby freeing courts to engage in such inquiry openly (and
more accountably), 125 without having to accommodate the inhibiting confines of adverse possession doctrine.
Prior to the supreme court's pronouncement in O'Keeffe, the lesson in New Jersey had been that, as applied to personalty, the traditional hornbook rule of possession produced arbitrary and
conflicting results. 26 Indeed, the incongruous determinations of
the lower courts in O'Keeffe 127 had demonstrated that adverse posI18 R.

BROWN.

supra note 14, § 4.2, at 36 (footnotes omitted).

S19 Helmholz, 11'rongfiul Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw.

U.L. REV. 1221, 1236 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
120 Id. (footnote omitted).
121 Id. (footnote omitted).
122 See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
I23, See supra notes 54-56, 104-09 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
125 One is reminded of Justice Handler's characterization of "[a] valid judicial
decision" as "one that holds no secrets or hidden meanings ....
" Handler,Jurisprudence and PrudentiaiJusice, 16 SETON HALL L.REV. 571, 596 (1986).
126 See supra notes 26-40, 43-53. 85-97 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
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session "no longer provides a fair and reasonable means of resolving this kind of dispute."' 2 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court's
holding is rooted immutably in its conviction that, "[p]roperly interpreted, the discovery rule becomes a vehicle for transporting equitable considerations into the statute of limitations for replevin." ' 29 As
one commentator would concur,"[t]he policy of applying the discovery rule to those situations where equity and justice demand flexibility favors the extension of the rule to the situation of an art theft
victim who knows he has a replevin cause of action but does not
30
know against whom or in which jurisdiction it may be brought."'1
Thus, O'Keeffe found the New Jersey Supreme Court heeding its
earlier entreaty to extend the discovery rule "whenever equity and
justice" warrant its application.13 ' Perhaps fittingly, then, in New
Jersey the case's principal legacy to date resides in its value as precedent for the continued expansion of the discovery rule. 13 2 Repeatedly, O'Keeffe is cited as authority for that doctrine's accommodating
and equitable application, as the discovery rule reaches categories of
allegations ranging from legal malpractice13 3 to fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract 34 to conversion of negotiable
instruments. 135
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 496-97, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (1980).
Id. at 498, 416 A.2d at 872.
Comment, supra note 26, at 1153-54. The author concluded:
Unlike the doctrines of demand and refusal and adverse possession, the
discovery rule's comprehensive inquiry into all relevant factors sufficiently protects the rights of art theft victims who encounter practical
difficulties in locating stolen works of art without trampling on the
rights and expectations of innocent purchasers of art.
Comment, supra note 26, at 1157.
13' Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (1973). See supra notes
59-67 and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., Mancuso v. Mancuso, 209 N.J. Super. 51, 55-57, 506 A.2d 1253,
1255-56 (App. Div. 1986) (tort action based on automobile negligence); Mant v.
Gillespie, 189 N.J. Super. 368, 372-73, 460 A.2d 172, 174-75 (App. Div. 1983)
(legal malpractice): Axelrod v. CBS Publications, Inc., 185 N.J. Super. 359, 369-70,
448 A.2d 1023, 1028-29 (App. Div. 1982) (fraudulent inducement to enter into
contract); Torcon, Inc. v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 205 N.J. Super. 428, 432, 501 A.2d
182, 184 (Ch. Div. 1985) (demand for arbitration under construction contract); see
also Hadden v. Eli Lilly & Co., 208 N.J. Super. 716, 720-21, 506 A.2d 844, 846-47
(App. Div. 1986) (absent statutory tolling right, discovery rule would apply to products liability action for injuries resulting from drug (DES) plaintiff's mother took
during pregnancy).
133 l1ant, 189 N.J. Super. at 372-73, 460 A.2d at 172.
134 Axelrod, 185 N.J. Super. at 369-70, 448 A.2d at 1028.
135 DeHart v. First Fidelity Bank, 67 Bankr. 740, 744-45 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
128
129
130
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The Tradition of Reform

O'Keeffe has a place in the New Jersey Supreme Court's tradition of displaying "considerable ingenuity in adapting common
law principles to new conditions and new uses."' 3 6 The decision's departure from strained precedent, 1 37 coupled with its innovative application of the discovery rule,13 8 reflects a larger and
well-established willingness on the part of the court to introduce
change by abandoning doctrines that no longer "represent[] current notions of rightness or fairness."' 139 Moreover, viewed in the
context of its theoretical and conceptual antecedents, 4 ° O'Keeffe's
deviation from the norm of stare decisis' 4 ' illustrates certain of
involved when a state
the jurisprudential considerations that are
14 2
court of last resort announces new law.
As a general matter, the importance of precedent in judicial
decision-making is well-documented. 14 3 Adherence to the doc136 G. TARR & M. PORTER, supra note 27, at 225. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. For an insightful discussion by a member of the New Jersey
Supreme Court on the implications ofjudicial responsiveness in the context of contemporary jurisprudence, see Handler, supra note 125.
137 As noted, the OKeeffe court overruled Redmond v. New Jersey Historical
Soc'y, 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 28 A.2d 189 (N.J. 1942), and Joseph v. Lesnevich, 56 N.J.
Super. 340, 153 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1959), to the extent that those decisions held
that the doctrine of adverse possession applies to chattels. See supra notes 26-40, 4353, 85-97 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 68-71, 101-02, 107-09 and accompanying text.
139 Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 39, 141 A.2d 276, 282
(1958). In Collopy, the supreme court abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity. Subsequently, the legislature reinstated the doctrine. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:53A-7 to -11 (West 1986). See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 26-71 and accompanying text.
141 The term stare decisis is an abbreviation of the doctrine stare decisis non quieta
movere, which has been interpreted to mean "[w]hen a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed ... ." 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 477 (Lacy ed. 1889).
142 See generally Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1966); von
Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV. 409 (1924); Wachtler, Stare Decisis and a Changing New York Court of Appeals, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 445
(1985).

143 A thorough recitation of the voluminous legal scholarship on the nature and
implications of stare decisis is beyond the scope of this article. The leading texts
and articles include: B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); R.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 240-50 (1986); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
110-15 (1977); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS (1960); R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A
THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1961); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
735 (1949); Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982);
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66
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trine of stare decisis provides stability in the law, 1 44 thereby facilitating the worthy aims of predictability, 45 uniformity 46 and
efficiency.' 47 The precept that like cases should be treated
alike, 148 however, is tempered by judicial
recognition that, in cer49
tain instances, change is necessary.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has long vindicated one of
the common law's "most essential attributes-its inherent capacity constantly to renew its vitality and usefulness by adapting itself gradually and piecemeal to meeting the demonstrated needs
of the time.'

15 °

Indeed, in diverse categories of actions implicat-

ing both individual rights and societal interests, the court has departed from established common law doctrine and instituted
extraordinary change.15 The court's common law jurisprudence
is replete with illustrations of landmark judicial decision-making, 152 as it has initiated broad reform in such complex areas as
products liability,

51

social host liability,

54

and public trust

N.C.L. REV. 367 (1988); Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941);
Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1983).
144 See Douglas, supra note 143, at 736 ("Stare decisis serves to take the capricious
element out of law and to give stability to a society."); von Moschzisker, supra note
142, at 409 ("A natural desire for stability in the law gave rise to a reliance on
decided cases as far back as Bracton .... ").
145 See, e.g., R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 143, at 68-70; Loughran, Some Reflections
on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22 FORDIAM L. REV. 1, 4 (1953).
146 See, e.g., R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 143, at 69-72.
147 See B. CARDOZO, supra note 143, at 149 ("[Tlhe labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in
every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him."); R. WASSERSTROM,
supra note 143, at 72-74 (efficiency justification for adherence to precedent is
persuasive).
148 See R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 143, at 69-72.
149 See

D.

CHAMBERLAIN,

THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS: ITS REASONS AND ITS

EXTENT 19 (1885) ("degree of authority" to be afforded a given precedent "depends, of necessity, on its agreement with the spirit of the times . . . and . . . the

compulsion or exigency of the doctrine is, in the last analysis, moral and intellectual, rather than arbitrary or inflexible"); Douglas, supra note 143, at 737 ("stare
decisis must give way before the dynamic component of history").
150 Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 14, 76 A.2d 877, 878 (1950) (Vanderbilt, J., dissenting). See generally G. TARR & M. PORTER, supra note 27, at 225 ("[A]t least in the
period since 1958, the New Jersey Supreme Court has eagerly adopted-and fre-

quently initiated-changes in the common law.").
151 See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
152 With respect to the New Jersey Supreme Court's tradition of reform in the
arena of constitutional adjudication, see Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey
Supreme Court'sJudicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. RE. 30 (1988). See also G. TARR &
M. PORTER, supra note 27, at 205-24.
153 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
the court determined that the privity requirement would no longer be a bar to auto-
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doctrine. 5' 5
By contrast, the subject-matter and procedural concerns implicated by O'Keefe are far more discrete, and not apt to transcend with substantial magnitude the interests of the litigants
themselves.' 56 The court was not acting in an area susceptible to
significant reliance interests. 1 57 Moreover, in the years since it
had issued its last pronouncement on the application of adverse
possession doctrine to personalty, 15 8 the discovery rule had been
promulgated.' 59 The likely absence of widespread reliance, coupled with the intervening advent of new equitable doctrine, suggests that in this context application of the norm of stare decisis
should be limited. As aptly stated by Justice Cardozo:
There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable
position when the rule to be discarded may not reasonably be
supposed to have determined the conduct of the litigants, and
particularly when in its origin it was the product of institutions
or conditions which have gained a new significance or development with the progress of the years.' 60
Moreover, insofar as O'Keeffe imposed a new procedural, as opposed
to substantive, standard, -[t]he considerations of policy that dictate
adherence to existing rules .. .apply with diminished force ...

Certainly, then, O'Keeffe is neither as profound nor as potentially
mobile manufacturer liability, and that the warranty limitation in the contract of
sale would not insulate the manufacturer from liability when the automobile proves
defective. Id. at 404-05, 161 A.2d at 95. The decision inspired "the most rapid and
altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the
law of torts." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791, 793-94 (1966). The standard of strict liability soon followed. See Santor
v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
154 See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 552-53, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (1984) (principles of negligence, coupled with public policy concerns, warranted judicially-imposed liability on social host for injuries caused by guest who becomes intoxicated
and drives).
155 See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294
A.2d 47 (1972) (transforming doctrine obligating sovereign to use land covered by
navigable waters for public interest).
156 See supra notes 73-84, 101, 114-16 and accompanying text.
157 As noted, prior to O'Keeffe, the last judicial pronouncement in New Jersey on
the application of adverse possession doctrine to personalty was issued in 1959. See
Joseph v. Lesnevich, 56 N.J. Super. 340, 153 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1959); see supra
notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
158 Lesnevich, 56 N.J. Super. at 356-57, 153 A.2d at 358. See supra notes 43-53 and
accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
160 B. CARDOZO, supra note 143, at 151.
161 Id. at 156. See also von Moschzisker, supra note 142, at 420 (In domain of procedural law, "changes may be made with a greater degree of freedom ....").
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far-reaching as many of the court's pioneering departures from existing doctrine.162 Still, the decision is indicative of the New Jersey
Supreme Court's responsible willingness to critically reassess and,
when necessary, innovatively reformulate the law to accommodate
imperatives of "rightness and fairness."' 6 3 O'Keeffe reflects, however
modestly, "the court's acceptance of the legitimacy of judicial creativity ' ' 64 to ensure those ends.
V.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the supreme court's pronouncement in O'Keeffe, the
lesson in New Jersey had been that, as applied to personalty, adverse possession doctrine produced arbitrary and incongruous
results.' 6 1 O'Keeffe renounced the strained precedent that had
yielded such inconsistencies, introducing in its stead the discovery rule. With respect to chattels, the viability of that equitable
principle as an alternative to the open and notorious requirement, however that requirement is manipulated or quietly defied,
seems evident.' 6 6 At a minimum, the discovery rule obligates a
more explicit and responsive balancing of the relevant equities,16 7 thereby freeing courts to engage in such inquiry openly
and more accountably.
Moreover, O'Keeffe's ready departure from the norm of stare
decisis, coupled with its creative holding, offers a discrete illustration of the New Jersey Supreme Court's endorsement of the
viability ofjudicial innovation to vindicate perceived aims of fairness and justice.' 6 8 While the subject-matter and procedural concerns associated with the case are modest, and not likely to
implicate with substantial magnitude collective or societal interests, the decision has a place in the supreme court's distinguished
tradition of reform.
See supra notes 139, 150-55 and accompanying text.
Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 39, 141 A.2d 276, 282
(1958).
164 G. TARR & M. PORTER, supra note 27, at 231.
165 See supra notes 26-40, 43-53, 85-97 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 51-53, 104-09, 122-30 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 150-55.
162
163

